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Abstract
This paper discusses a regulatory plan known as asset-based reserve
requirements. By examining the history of reserve requirements in the United
States and of current regulatory proposals and practices, I argue that a system of
asset-based reserve requirements may provide a useful, though not often
considered alternative to the current structures of liability based reserve
requirements and capital requirements. Required reserves based on assets provide
the Federal Reserve with a powerful, versatile, and adaptable policy tool for
monetary policy. Additionally, they ensure risk-assessment, reduce the moral
hazard problem associated with deposit insurance, and when applied to all
fmancial institutions create a level playing field in the desegregated financial
sector. Asset-based reserve requirements do all those things without burdening
depositors as liability based reserve requirements do, and without the pro-cyclical
characteristics inherent in capital requirements. The work of Thomas Palley (2000
& 2001), Frederic Mishkin (1998), Alan Greenspan (1998), Henry Kaufman

(1994), Joshua Feinman (1993), and Paul Bennett (1997 & 2001) was relied upon
to reach this conclusion.
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Asset-Base: New Reserve Requirements
for a New Banking Industry
Reserve requirements have changed very little since their creation by the
National Bank Act of 1863 (Feinman, 1993). With the creation of deposit
insurance in 1933 the need for reserve requirements to safeguard to the public
interest was diminished. In ;more recent years, the banking industry and financial
sector of the economy have changed dramatically, primarily through financial
innovations like sweep accounts and derivatives, and deregulation like the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Mergers have also played a significant role.
With the loss of segregated markets, banks are exposed to competition for deposits
from other financial institutions. Because of reserve requirements, depository
institutions, such as banks and savings and loans face competitive disadvantages
relative to other finan~ial institutions. In light of these developments, the role of
reserve requirements has changed. Should required reserves be kept as a
regulatory structure in light of changing financial system? If so, what structure
should they take?
The changing financial system has led to debate about the future of the
current reserve requirement system. I will discuss some possible proposals
including eliminating required reserves altogether and encouraging the Federal
Reserve (Fed) to pay interest on reserve balances. I will also discuss the current
system for measuring and safeguarding risk that many consider an alternative to
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reserve requirements. The system of capital requirements for banks is an
international program to require banks to take adequate steps to control risk. Does
a regulatory structure exist that would combine the risk measurement of capital
requirements with the monetary policy tool of reserve requirements? Could this
regulatory structure also create more equal competition in the financial sector?
Asset-based reserve requirements would provide the Federal Reserve with
such a regulatory structure. I assert that a system of reserve requirements based on
the assets a financial institution holds would provide long-term stability in the
economy while ensuring adequate risk precaution. If imposed on all financial
institutions, it would create a level playing field for banks and other financial
institutions.
By researching the history of reserve requirements, recent changes in the
quantity of reserves, deregulation and financial innovation in the financial sector,
and comparing recent proposals to reform reserve requirements and capital
requirements, I found that asset-based reserve requirements are a superior
regulatory system. They provide the Federal Reserve with many possible benefits
as a policy tool. Required reserves based on assets have the potential to allow the
Fed to target specific interest rates for specific asset classes. The system also
encourages financial institutions to evaluate the risks they take, and reduces the
moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance. Aside from monetary
control, risk-assessment, and moral hazard reduction, asset-based reserve

Asset Base 6

requirements create a versatile system that can easily adapt to financial innovation
and deregulation, while helping to bring stability to the economy. While not every
aspect of asset-based reserve requirements may be considered useful in the longterm, its overall stability and adaptability make it a superior alternative to the
current systems ofliability-based reserve requirements and capital requirements.

The Fractional Reserve Banking System
The banking industry is vital to the modem economy. Most people are
familiar with banks making loans from the deposits of others (Edwards &
Mishkin, 1995). In addition to acting as intermediary between borrowers and
lenders, commercial banks in a fractional reserve banking system are also capable
of expanding and contracting the money supply through the money multiplier
(Mishkin, 1998). The ability of banks to influence the money supply may be best
described with a simple example.
In fractional reserve banking, individual customers deposit money into
personal demand deposit accounts (checking accounts). Because the average daily
demand for cash withdrawals is substantially less than the sum of all deposits
made, commercial banks do not have to keep all the cash deposited in their vaults
on hand. Instead, bank managers may loan some portion of the deposits and
charge interest on the resulting loan. These loans are the primary source of profit
in commercial banking.
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One question quickly arises: How much of those initial deposits can be
loaned by the bank? Because a bank must satisfy the needs of its customers for
daily withdrawals of cash, some quantity of the initial deposits must be held as
reserves. Being motivated by profit, bank managers desire to loan at interest all the
deposits until they reach the minimum necessary reserves. In an ideal world, banks
would always hold the necessary minimum reserves. This method of loaning
excess reserves at interest to make money is known as the fractional reserve
system of commercial banking.
The primary dangers of the fractional reserve system of banking include the
possibility of bank panics and over-expansion of the money supply. If depositors
lose faith in the banking system, they can easily outstrip the minimum reserves
available at the bank at any given time. If this crisis spreads to other banks, the
banks will begin to call in loans in an attempt to satisfy depositor demands. On the
other hand, commercial banks, in their pursuit of profit, can over-expand the
money supply by supplying too much credit to borrowers for risky projects. If
these borrowers default, the quantity of bad or under-performing loans increases,
and a contraction of credit and bankruptcy may ensue. In both circumstances, a
collapse of the banking system is the most extreme possible result.
History of Reserve Requirements

Because commercial banks pursue profit by extending loans, a process that
expands the money supply, the goals of profit and stability can be contradictory.
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Consequently, reserve requirements were created by the National Bank Act of
1863 to ensure the liquidity ofbanks (Feinman, 1993). At their inception, required
reserves were 25% against both bank notes and deposits (Feinman, 1993).
Balances had to be held in the vault of the bank, and up to 60% could be held in
interest bearing accounts in banks in "redemption" cities (Feinman, 1993 ).
Reserve requirements were lifted on bank notes in 1873 (Feinman, 1993). As a
result of legislation passed in the late 1950s, reserve requirements may now be
held either as vault cash or in non-interest-bearing accounts with the Federal
Reserve (Feinman, 1993).
In addition to reducing risk by helping ensure a bank's liquidity, required

reserves serve as an important policy tool for the Federal Reserve, which was
created in 1913. One way monetary policy influences economic activity is through
the reserves market, which consists of the supply and demand for reserves (Board
of Governors, 1994). The Fed controls the supply of reserves, that is, money
available for banks to borrow through the discount window. Reserves are also
created and managed through open market operations when the Fed buys
government securities (Board of Governors, 1994). Reserve requirements allow
the Fed to control more accurately the demand for reserves, which is the sum of
required reserves and excess reserves (Board of Governors, 1994). Banks will
usually try to have the fewest reserves possible. This fact can be seen historically
in Graph Al in Appendix A, which shows how closely related required reserves
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and total reserves are. With more control over the demand for reserves, the Fed
can better anticipate how to manipulate the supply of reserves to bring a desired
equilibrium to the reserves market.
Declining Significance of Reserve Requirements

The significance of reserve requirements has been declining for several
years. Since 1913, the reserve requirement structure has been changed several
times, the most recent in 1992, when the required reserve ratio was lowered.
Additionally, the reserves market that the Fed monitors has changed due to
deregulation and financial innovation. Because of the declining size of reserves,
the Fed's ability to influence the money supply may be declining, but this does not
seem to be the case.
The significance of reserve requirements was reduced by the adoption of
the Federal Reserve System in 1913, because the Fed was required to act as a
lender of last resort (Feinman, 1993). The Fed acts as "lender oflast resort" when
they loan funds to banks that have no other sources of credit, especially in cases of
bank panics or financial crises (Mishkin, 1998). The Fed became a source of
liquidity for banks, decreasing the role reserve requirements played in ensuring the
stability of the banking system. Required reserves on deposits were lowered by
the Fed at its creation to 18% in central reserve city banks, 15% in reserve city
banks, and 12% for countcy banks (Feinman, 1993). Time deposits (certificates of
deposit) were subject to a 5% reserve requirement (Feinman, 1993). Reserve
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requirement changes from 1913 through 1980 are summarized in Charts 1, 2, and

3.
The charts are divided by major changes in the structure of reserve
requirements. Before 1962, the Fed classified banks by their location in or near
central reserve cities (Feinman, 1993). The next change came in 1966 when a
graduated system based on location was developed (Feinman, 1993). In 1973,
reserve requirements were no longer based on location at all.
Prior to 1980, only member banks were required by the Fed to hold a
portion of their deposits in reserve (Board of Governors, 1994). Member banks
include all nationally chartered banks, and state banks that voluntarily joined the
Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors, 1994). In 1998, about 33% of
commercial banks were members of the Fed, down from a peak of 49% in 1947
(Mishkin, 1998). The Monetary Control Act of 1980 made all depository
institutions-commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loans, and credit
unions-subject to reserve requirements whether or not they were members of the
Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors, 1994). One reason forthe passage
of the act was to counteract declining membership in the Fed System (Mishkin,
1998). Changes in reserve requirements since the passage of the Monetary Control
Act can be found in Chart 4.
Before 1984, the Federal Reserve targeted Ml (Board of Governors, 1994).
The reserve base was used for short-term control of Ml (Feinman, 1993). After
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1984, due to the development of NOW accounts and deregulation in deposit
interest rates, interest rates in Ml became more volatile, and Ml was deemed an
unfit target for the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy (Board of
Governors, 1994). The Fed began concentrating on M2, believing M2 targeting
was more closely linked to monetary policy objectives than Ml (Feinman, 1993).
After shifting to M2, ''the basic structure of reserve requirements, which had been
meticulously designed to facilitate control of Ml through a reserves-oriented
targeting procedure," was suddenly obsolete (Feinman, 1993). Table A2 in
Appendix A details the components of Ml, M2, and other money aggregates.
Graph A2 shows the changes in Ml, M2, and M3 since 1980.
Required reserves have declined for other reasons. The Fed lowered reserve
requirements in 1990 and in 1992 (Bennett & Peristiani, 2001) to a level of zero
for nonpersonal time deposits and 10% for transactions deposits (Board of
Governors, 1994). The Fed explained the cuts as a means of putting banks in a
better position to extend credit (Board of Governors, 1994). Also, cutting reserve
requirements provided a way to expand the money supply. Another factor,
probably as important as deregulation, reducing the reserve requirements is the
financial innovation known as the "sweep account" (Bennett & Peristiani, 2001 ).
A sweep account is a special savings account into which checking deposits at a
bank are "swept" at the end of the business day (Bennett & Hilton, 1997). "Since
January 1994, hundreds of banks and other depository financial institutions have
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initiated sweep programs to avoid statutory reserve requirements on transactions
deposits" (Anderson, 1997).
What are the effects of reductions in reserve requirements or their
circumvention through financial innovations? Lowering the reserve requirement
allows the money supply to expand through the money multiplier (Mishkin, 1998).
The basis for this argument comes from the equation M = m

* MB, where M is the

money supply, m is the multiplier, in which the required reserve ratio, the
percentage of deposits that must be held in reserve, is in the denominator, and MB
is the monetary base, which consists of currency in circulation and reserves at the
Fed, which includes required reserves and excess reserves (Mishkin, 1998). Since
1980, the level of reserves has fluctuated between $35 billion and $60 billion, but
has been falling since 1994, while the monetary base has grown rapidly. When
required reserves fall, the money multiplier increases, which could cause an
increase in the money supply. On the other hand, when the required reserves fall,
the monetary base may also fall, which could cause a decrease in the money
supply. Required reserves as a percentage of the monetary base has been falling
since 1980. An illustration of this is in Graph A3 in Appendix A. Graph A4 shows
that the growth in the monetary base as a percentage of money aggregates has
been increasing, meaning that the monetary base is growing along with, or more
rapidly than the money supply, even though falling reserves should cause the
monetary base to fall. That discrepancy means that the Fed has more than
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compensated for the fall in reserves by increasing the level of currency in the
economy, to raise the monetary base and the money supply. It also shows that the
multiplier (money supply/monetary base) has not been growing rapidly and the
Fed has been able to control the growth of the money supply.
The role of reserve requirements has changed a great deal over the years.

Are required reserves still necessary or useful? Would a new reserve requirements
structure increase the stability of the American financial system and reduce the
cost of regulatory compliance?
Because of deregulation and the large number of bank mergers and
acquisitions, the structure of the banking industry has been changing rapidly
during the 1990's. How have such mergers changed the flexibility and security of
the financial system, in size and in scope?
The response of the policy analysts to these questions has been varied.
Many believe mergers have had no impact on the security of the financial system,
and have promoted legislation that continues to remove restrictions on financial
'

practices. In keeping with this perspective, they have proposed regulatory schemes
eliminating reserve requirements or requiring the Federal Reserve to pay interest
on deposits held with the Fed (Feinman, 1993). The merits of these proposals will
be evaluated. Other analysts are less convinced that financial sector desegregation
does not undermine its security. I will also analyze a regulatory plan that
addresses their concerns. This reserve requirement system is based on the specific
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assets a financial institution holds (Palley, 2000). This asset-based concept is
substantially different from the current reserve requirement system where reserves
are based on liabilities.

The Banking Industry and Legislation
Banks, or depository institutions, were divided into categories based on
what assets (loans) they held and what sort of liabilities (deposits) they incurred.
This segregation in the industry occurred mainly due to two pieces of legislation,
The Banking Act of 1933 (called Glass-Steagall) and The Banking Act of 1935
(Mishkin, 1998). For each institution, the dollar value of certain deposits
determined the required quantity of reserves. Deposits traditionally subject to
reserve requirements were interest bearing and non-interest bearing checking
accounts and large, nonpersonal time deposits (Board of Governors, 1994). The
main types of depository institutions included savings and loans, commercial
banks, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Each of these banks held certain
types of assets and liabilities. For example, depository institutions held deposits
'

and made various types of business loans, consumer loans, and mortgages
(Mishkin, 2001 ). Investment banks, another classification of financial institution,
possessed assets like loans, stocks, and bonds, and issued liabilities such as stocks,
bonds, commercial paper, and shares in mutual funds (Mishkin, 2001). A complete
breakdown of institutions and their associated assets and liabilities is presented in
Table A2 of the Appendix.
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Prior to the Great Depression, commercial banks could engage in
investment bank activities like underwriting, a fact often considered as one cause
of bank failure (Mishkin, 1997). The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 required that
commercial banks sell off investment bank operations (Mishkin, 1997). It may
also have been that bank failures had less to do with the specific activities of the
banks (like underwriting), but rather the quality of assets they held during the
middle and late 1920s (Friedman & Schwartz, 1967).
The government, through such legislation as the McFadden Act of 1927,
which prohibited interstate banking, and the Glass Steagall Act, heavily regulated
the banking system (Dymski, 2000). Legislators designed Glass-Steagall to reduce
small depositories' exposure to risk. For example, depositor funds could not be
used to buy stocks in a company, but rather to extend loans, which are less risky
than stocks.
Deregulation in the 1980s led to more market-based deposit rates and to
more freedom for banks to acquire and use funds as they desired (Dymski, 2000).
The McFadden Act was rendered void by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Stiroh & Poole, 2000). The 1994 act allowed
bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state, and permitted banks to
branch across state lines (Mishkin, 1998). Less stringent enforcement of
legislation like Glass-Steagall continued into the 1990s when several bank mergers
were allowed between commercial and investment banks (Dymski, 2000).
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With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, Glass-Steagall
was dead. Commercial banks can now hold equity in securities and insurance
through the more extensive use of Bank Holding Companies (Furlong, 2000). The
idea of creating a more competitive banking sector may benefit customers with
better loan rates, better deposit rates, and increased services. The removal of
regulatory safeguards originally conceived to protect consumers from banks
overextending themselves was a fundamental component ofGramm-Leach-Bliley.
Because of deregulation, financial institutions are no longer neatly
segregated according to assets and liabilities. For example, banks may now create
accounts that mimic money market mutual funds, once reserved only for
investment banks.
Financial Innovation and Declining Reserve Balances
For years, banks have sought ways of circumventing regulations. New
forms of bank liabilities were developed, like NOW accounts (Feinman, 1993).
This drive for profit has led to a decreasing importance in traditional checking
account deposits (Edwards & Mishkin, 1995). In order to compete with other
financial institutions in the deregulated financial sector, banks have been forced to
develop new activities to attract and maintain customers (Edwards & Mishkin,
1995).
Around 1995, banks increasingly began taking advantage of a financial
innovation called "sweep accounts" (Bennett & Hilton, 1997). Since required

Asset Base 17

reserves are calculated based on an average of end-of-day balances over two
weeks, banks would be required to hold fewer reserves if somehow, they had low
demand deposit balances at the end of the day (Bennett & Hilton, 1997). Sweep
accounts allow bank managers to avoid reserve requirements by moving money
from one type of account to another. At the end of a day's business, money in
customer's checking accounts (subject to reserve requirements) are "swept" into
savings accounts (not subject to reserve requirements) overnight, and back in the
morning (Bennett & Hilton, 1997). This activity has had a negative impact on
reserve balances, both for required and total reserves. The estimated reduction in
reserves has been $18 billion (Bennett & Hilton, 1997). To the extent reserves are
designed to ensure banks can meet the liquidity needs of its customers, this
circumvention of reserve requirements defeats that purpose. The creation of sweep
accounts provides an excellent example of how persistently banks will try to
circumvent regulatory control. Graph A5 in the appendix shows the growing use
of sweep accounts. Also, looking at Graph Al shows how reserves, both required
'

and total, have fallen steadily since 1995, with some growth in the early years of
this decade.
Another financial innovation of interest in relation to reserves has been
derivatives. Financial derivatives were created to facilitate better risk
management, in response to interest rate swings and stock and bond market
volatility (Mishkin, 1998). "Derivatives are financial securities whose value is
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derived from another 'underlying' financial security" (Financial Pipeline, 2002).
The underlying cash instruments can be things like stocks, commodities, or
foreign currency (Financial Pipeline, 2002). Examples of derivatives are forward
contracts, financial futures, options, and swaps (Mishkin, 1998).
While derivatives were designed to hedge, or counter-act, risk, some
characteristics of derivatives actually enhance the risk to financial institutions.
One example of an increase in risk is the ability of financial institutions to
leverage their positions since large dollar-value assets can be purchased with
relatively little money down (Mishkin, 1998). Another example is the huge
notional values (the amount on which interest is paid) of derivative contracts that
are often significantly greater than the total capital of the institutions holding them
(Mishkin, 1998). These two dangers may lead to problems such as exposure to
credit risks, or not being able to have an open position covered (Kaufinan, H.,
1994). The other side of this argument is that derivatives, when used in inverse to
existing risk, can greatly reduce total risk. Regulatory guidelines, some of which
came from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
of 1991, require banks to develop risk-management strategies and carefully
monitor their risk exposure (Mishkin, 1998).
Whether or not derivatives are actually substantially riskier than other bank
assets is subject to debate. Financial institutions may implement safeguards like
credit limits on swap transactions, which terminate a swap agreement if the credit
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rating of one party falls below a specified level (Edwards & Mishkin, 1995).
Despite arguments to the contrary, most agree that financial derivatives do contain
risk for which banks and other financial institutions, though required to manage
and monitor their risk, are not required by law to adequately compensate through
reserve requirements.
Deregulation's Effect on Consolidation

Financial innovation is not the only cause of a newly structured banking
industry. The erosion of banking regulation led to an increase in bank mergers.
Some of the main deregulatory acts like Riegle-Neal and Gramm-Leach-Bliley
were discussed earlier. Throughout the history of the banking sector, mergers have
mostly occurred in waves, the most recent began in the middle 1980s and
continued until the late 1990s (Soper, 2001 ). During this time period, regulations
were being relaxed or i"epealed altogether. From 1980 to 2000, 1.75 banks
disappeared per business day (Dymski, 2000), a decline of 40% (Soper, 2001 ). In
1998 alone, four of the ten largest mergers, based on market value, occurred in the
banking industry (Stiroh & Poole, 2000). Firms in the once segregated banking
industry now cross over into, and merge with other firms in, other sectors of the
industry.
With deregulation and desegregation of the industry, the mere ability to
expand into other markets and increase total revenues provides a strong incentive
for banks and financial institutions to merge. Additionally, the desire to diversify
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the asset base may entice many institutions to merge. Economist Donald Dewey
expounded another reason for mergers. He argued that mergers were primarily an
alternative to bankruptcy, so as to avoid the loss of assets (as cited in Manne,
1965). As banks near bankruptcy, either other banks will desire to purchase their
remaining assets more inexpensively, or the failing bank may desire to be
purchased to avoid the loss of assets and/or jobs. Manne suggests mergers are one
of the most efficient methods for changing control of a firm because it lessens
wasteful bankruptcies and leads to more efficient management of a firm (Manne,
1965). Manne seems to have been correct about avoiding the loss of assets. While
the number of banks fell by a third in the 1990s, bank assets rose 30% (Stiroh &
Poole, 2000). Some frequently cited reasons for engaging in bank mergers include:
revenue growth from a large customer base; efficiencies in operations; ability to
spread fixed costs over a larger customer base; diversification of income from both
products and geographic area; stabilization of asset quality; optimal deployment of
excess capital; and the search for higher value of common shares (as cited in
Soper, 2001).
To summarize, the homogenization in the financial industry in deregulatory
times is often justified with arguments of economies of scale and scope, and
increased efficiency and profitability, as well as with the notion that merger
activity in the absence of regulation is the market's way of reacting to a poorly
constructed banking system (Dymski, 2000). It is impossible to know what the
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U.S. financial system would look like ifthere had been no regulatory safeguards,
but it seems highly unlikely that the United States banking system was poorly
constructed. While it may have been far from perfect it seems very peculiar that a
poorly devised scheme could have survived for several decades and not, at least
apparently, hurt the growth of the economy (Dymski, 2000).
Despite arguments to the contrary, several studies, including Dymski, have
shown that larger banks are neither more efficient nor more profitable. Economies
of scale have been found in middle-sized banks, with the very smallest and very
largest performing poorly in relation to profits. Using cost analysis, banks.with
assets between $100 million and $200 million are most efficient, compared to the
10 largest United States banks, which have assets in excess of $100 billion
(Dymski, 2000). In light of this evidence, the urge to merge cannot be explained
solely on the grounds of efficiency.
The increase in risk associated with deregulation is often overlooked. At
first, it may seem counter-intuitive that allowing banks to enter various markets
poses an increased risk. Allowing a bank to enter into different geographic areas,
but still perform the same function, should eliminate risk by diversifying the
bank's portfolio of assets. The problem arises when a bank, once regulated to
handle only customer deposits and mortgages and loans begins handling riskier
assets and liabilities like mutual fund accounts and stocks and bonds. A moral
hazard problem, where one party in a transaction engages in behavior deemed too
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risky by the other party, results from this change in asset types in banks (Mishkin,
1998). Banks will want to funnel depositor funds into assets likely to earn the
highest possible interest rate in an attempt to maximize profit. Many additionally
argue this moral hazard problem is exacerbated by deposit insurance, in that banks
with insured deposits may engage in behavior riskier than depositors might think
is necessary.
Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance

At first, deposit insurance may not appear to be relevant to reserve
requirements. In many ways, the two are not directly related. However, both are
examples of regulations imposed on banks, and currently, both are applied to
deposit liabilities of banks. Additionally, both are instituted to provide liquidity,
stability, and risk insurance to banks during bank panics or financial crises.
Deposit insurance, by its very nature, creates a moral hazard problem
(Hane, 1999). If banks engage in risky behavior, the owners will reap the profits.
In fact, studies have shown that prior to the Great Depression, states that enacted
deposit insurance had higher failure rates of insured banks compared to uninsured
banks (Wheelock, 1992). However, when a bank fails, the burden of paying off
depositors falls to the insurance company, namely, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) or the federal government (Hane, 1999).
The moral hazard problem noted above may already be in the process of
being rectified, at least partially. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has
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been slightly revamped by new legislation that would make the deposit insurance
system privately, rather than publicly, funded. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 and the Deposit Insurance Funds
Act (DIFA) of 1996 shifted the liability from taxpayers to the banks themselves in
the event of bank failures and changed the FDIC premium structure, respectively
(Kaufinan, G., 2001).
The first piece of legislation, FDICIA, requires that the FDIC maintain
reserves of at least 1.25% on insured deposits (Kaufinan, G ., 2001 ). If a bank
failure, or run of bank failures, pushes this number down, then as reserves are
depleted, insurance premiums on banks must be raised to return the FDIC to the
1.25% level (Kaufinan, G., 2001). Before this act, premiums did not have to be
raised, and no level of reserve ratio existed, and so when banking crises would
occur, the government· was often forced to handle the problem (Kauftnan, G.,
2001 ). Additionally, the premiums have been designed to be risk-sensitive (Stem,
1992) by basing insurance premiums on capital ratios and risk ratings (Calem &
Rob, 1996). The idea of this legislation was to make the FDIC privately funded by
the banks themselves, rather than by the taxpayers. The FDICIA also makes it
more difficult for the FDIC to bail out large, uninsured institutions, often called
"too big to fail" (Kauftnan, G ., 2001 ).
The DIFA made the 1.25% ratio level a relative constant (Kauftnan, G .,
2001). This means that the FDIC cannot accumulate excess funds. The idea of this
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act was to require premium payments by only the banks classified as
undercapitalized, the ones considered most likely to fail (Kaufman, G., 2001). The
result is that less than 10% of all insured banking institutions are paying premiums
to the FDIC (Kaufman, G., 2001).
These two pieces of legislation, the FDICIA and the DIFA, have helped to
make banks more responsible for their own insurance. This will provide
encouragement for banks to adequately protect their deposits. Reserve
requirements in their current structure also act as a safeguard on deposits. It is
possible to argue that reserve requirements are simply another form of regulated
insurance on bank liabilities. However, banks incur risk by purchasing assets with
depositor funds. For that reason, it makes sense to require reserve requirements
according to bank assets in proportion to risk.
This brief history of the current structure of banking shows that changes in
regulations, bank mergers, and financial innovations have caused reserve
requirements to decrease substantially. The next section of the paper deals with
proposals to address the question: What role should the Federal Reserve play in
banking regulation? As noted by Henry Kaufman: " ... the primary objective of a
central bank should be to maintain the financial well-being of society in the
broadest sense" (Kaufman, H., 1994). At issue is whether or not a regulatory plan
including reserve requirements is necessary. If yes, how should that reserve
system be implemented?
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Proposal: No Reserve Requirements

Some groups, including persons believing in the efficiency of markets and
bank managers who do not like being regulated,· would like to see reserve
requirements eliminated. The primary arguments for terminating reserve
requirements are the so-called 'l'eserve tax" and the declining relevance of
required reserves in banking supervision.
The money banks hold as required reserves either at the Fed or as vault
cash is not available for loans, and may be seen as a tax equal to the amount of
interest not earned by holding the money (Feinman, 1993). The more reserves
required, the higher this tax. The only way to eliminate this tax on the private
sector would be to completely get rid of reserve requirements (Feinman, 1993). In
recent years, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom have stopped relying
on reserve requirements (Sellon & Weiner, 1997).
As noted earlier, required reserve balances have been declining in recent
years both in total and in relation to financial sector assets. A possible conclusion
is that required reserves are no longer relevant (Bennett & Peristiani, 200 I).
However, certain problems could arise from completely eliminating reserve
requirements. First of all, without some level of required reserves, the Fed would
have a much less accurate picture of the demand for reserves. The demand for
excess reserves may fluctuate greatly over the short term, making open market
operations in the absence of required reserves a much less precise as a policy tool
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(Board of Governors, 1994). The Fed would no longer have the ability to
implement an effective, reserves-oriented procedure to control the growth of the
money supply (Feinman, 1993). It should be noted that in recent years, the Fed has
used the level of currency in circulation to control the money supply. Coupled
with this problem is the potential for interest rate volatility, especially for shortterm rates because of the inability of the Fed to accurately determine the demand
for reserves in the setting of the discount rate (Sellon & Weiner, 1997). Finally, a
mathematical examination of the necessity of reserve requirements can be found in
Cothren and Waud (1994). Their argument is based on the idea that the utility of
depositors is larger under a reserve requirement scheme, since some portion of
their money is safe from shocks, and that banks will desire to loan nearly all
deposits, i.e., have very small levels of reserves. Both banks and depositors can be
better off if reserves are held. However, in the absence of a central authority
requiring reserves, the individual bank not holding reserves will make more profit.
Reserve requirements are necessary for sound banking practices (Cothren &
Waud, 1994).

Proposal: The Federal Reserve Pay Interest
Another policy plan to reform reserve requirements would not get rid of
them completely. Rather, this plan focuses on reducing the reserve tax by the
Federal Reserve paying interest on deposits held at the Fed. Historical evidence
does provide support for this idea, since prior to the creation of the Federal
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Reserve System, banks required to hold reserves could hold a portion in interestbearing accounts.
If the Fed were to pay interest on reserve balances, the "artificially imposed
incentive" to channel money away from depository institutions would be
eliminated (Feinman, 1993). Ifa market-based interest rate was paid on reserves
then the Fed could raise reserve requirements allowing bank.flexibility in
managing their reserves, reducing volatility in money and interest rate markets,
simplifying open market operations, and eliminating the desire for banks to try to
avoid regulation (Feinman, 1993). An alternative version of an interest-paying
scheme is that reserve requirements be raised and interest be paid only on the
higher, marginal balances banks would be required to hold (cited in Feinman,
1993).
There are problems with the idea of the Federal Reserve paying interest on
reserves. First of all, some of the Fed's earnings each year are turned over to the
U.S. Treasury (Feinman, 1993). If the Fed were to pay interest, its net earnings
would fall, meaning less would go to the Treasury. This loss of Treasury revenue
may not be very large, since reserve balances have been falling, meaning interest
payments would be going down as well (Feinman, 1993). However, if banks
earned a rate of return on their reserves held at the Fed, the level of reserves might
rise, increasing the loss of revenue to the Treasury. The magnitude of this specific
problem would be lessened by the alternative plan, since only the marginal
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balances would earn interest. Second, most financial institutions that hold
reserves meet their requirements with vault cash rather than by holding balances at
the Fed (Sellon & Weiner, 1997). This shift towards vault cash may be related to
the increase in A1Ms since cash held in an ATM can be counted as vault cash
(Bennett & Peristiani, 2001 ).
The notion of required reserves providing an incentive to channel money
away from depository institutions may be true. However, if a regulatory plan could
be implemented that would provide unilateral rules across the spectrum of
financial institutions, the Fed would not need to pay interest. Finally, seeing
reserve requirements as a tax is the result of a certain point of view. A different
way of looking at reserve requirements is to see them as a sort of payment that
depository institutions pay the Fed to insure the soundness of their industry, or
payment for services the Fed provides, like the discount window, or interest rate
determination.
Capital Requirements: The New Risk Measurement
Separate from the proposals to restructure reserve requirements are capital
requirements. A bank's capital is the bank's net worth, which is the difference
between assets and liabilities (Mishkin, 1998). If liabilities grow beyond the
bank's assets, the bank is bankrupt (Mishkin, 1998). Capi~l requirements are
regulations designed to ensure an appropriate level of capital, that is, an
appropriate gap between assets and liabilities. The purpose of capital requirements
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is to ensure banks account for market risk inherent in trading activities (Hendricks
& Hirtle, 1997). Prior to 1981, no such requirements existed when the Savings and

Loan crisis brought attention to the necessity of adequate capital ratios (Estrella,
1998). These requirements have now been implemented at an international level,
due to a growing awareness of the integration of the financial industry (Mishkin,
1998).
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supefvision issued the Basel
Accord (Estrella, 1998). Central Bank leaders from the Group of Ten countries
created the Basel Committee in 1974 (Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
2000). While the committee has no formal power in any of the member countries,
its proposed guidelines and plans were created by a multi-national group, and so
do carry considerable weight (BIS, 2000). The goals of the committee include
eliminating gaps in supervision beyond national boundaries, promoting "sound
supervisory standards worldwide," and encouraging cooperation between member
and non-member country's central banking authorities (BIS, 2000).
The Basel Accord of 1988 called for the creation and implementation of a
credit risk measurement framework (BIS, 2000). The accord created a graduated
system to account for risk. First, it divided assets and off-balance-sheet activities
(derivatives, options, futures contracts) into four, weighted classes of risk
(Mishkin, 1998). The classes are zero for no default risk, 20% for low default risk,
50% for moderate default risk, and 100% for high default risk (Mishkin, 1998).
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Each asset and off-balance sheet activity is categorized in one of these four
classes. Figured with their respective weights, the total ''risk-adjusted assets" is
computed (Mishkin, 1998). The capital requirements are then set up like this
(Mishkin, 1998):
"It [the bank] must have 'core' or Tier 1 capital (stockholder equity capital)
of at least 4 percent of total risk-adjusted assets, and total capital {Tier 1
capital plus Tier 2 capital, which is made up of loan loss reserves and
subordinated debt) must come to 8 percent of total risk-adjusted assets.
(Subordinated debt is debt that is paid off only after depositors and other
creditors have been paid.) For regulators to classify a bank as well
capitalized, it must meet an even more stringent total-capital requirement of
I 0 percent of risk-adjusted assets and Tier 1 capital of 6 percent of riskadjusted assets.?'
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The following exhibit provides an example of this concept.

Exhibit 1: Capital Requirement Calculation

Asset

Value

Bank reserves
Government Securities

100
150

Securities from
Government Agencies
Fully backed Mortgage
Bonds
Municipal Bonds
Residential Mortgages
Commercial Paper
Commercial Loans
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

Capital Requirements
Tier 1
Tier2
Total

Risk Weight
Class
0
0

200

20

300
75
400
50
450
500
2225

20
50
50
100
100
100

Minimum
Re uired
53.5
53.5
107

Risk Adjusted
Assets
1337.5

WellCa italized
80.25
53.5
133.75

The asset values have been made up to provide the example. Risk-adjusted
assets are calculated by adding the values of the assets multiplied by their
respective weights.
Risk-adjusted assets= 0(100 + 150) + 0.2(200 + 300) + 0.5(75 + 400) +
1.0(50 + 450 + 500) = 1337.5
To determine the capital requirements, the bank must hold 4% of risk-adjusted
assets as stockholder equity capital; this is Tier 1 capital. Total capital must be 8%
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of risk-adjusted assets. This level includes Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 2 is comprised
of loan loss reserves and subordinated debt. The percentages are higher for an
institution to be considered ''well capitalized" (Mishkin, 1998). Banks must hold
10% of total risk-adjusted assets, with 6% of risk-adjusted assets in Tier 1 capital
(Mishkin, 1998).

If a bank suspects some value of its loans will not be paid back and have to
be written off, the bank can set aside some of its earnings (Mishkin, 1998).
Because of the zero future value of bad loans, banks need to account for them in
the present in some way (Mishkin, 1998). They do that by reducing earnings by
the amount of uncollectible loans and adding that value in loan loss reserves
(Mishkin, 1998). Since loan loss reserves are not an asset and are not a liability,
they are counted as bank capital (Mishkin, 1998).
When companies, including banks and financial institutions, want to raise
capital without creating debt through bonds, they may incur subordinate debt. A
subordinated debenture is "an unsecured bond that gives bondholders a claim
'

secondary to that of other designated bondholders with respect to both interest
payments and assets" (Kapoor, Dlabay, & Hughes, 1999). Since the subordinate
debt is secondary to normal corporate bonds, it is not counted explicitly as a
liability, and therefore, may count as capital in Tier 2.
Capital requirements are an attempt to make banks more culpable for the
risks they incur. Much has changed in the banking industry since the Basel Accord
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was created in 1988. The accord did not allow for a changing financial climate, or
the rapid expansion of the financial services industry (Greenspan, 1998). In light
of those changes, the Basel Committee is working on a new Basel Capital Accord
(BIS, 2002). The new document will refine minimum capital requirements from
the 1988 accord, provide guidelines for supervisory review of the capital adequacy
of institutions, and enhance market discipline to encourage transparency and safe
banking practices (BIS, 2002).
Beyond the industry changes, the accord has another significant weakness.
In both the old form (Palley, 2000) and the soon to come form of the accord

(Carpenter, Whitesell, & Zakrajsek, 2001), pro-cyclical fluctuations in capital are
a problem. When the economy experiences a downturn, the value of assets fall and
the risk of default may grow (Carpenter et al, 2001 ). As that happens, the value of
capital falls. At the same time the value of capital (the gap between assets and
liabilities) is falling, the increased default risk of assets will cause capital
requirements to grow as assets are put in higher risk categories (Segoviano &
Lowe, 2002). Banks are then forced to find ways to raise capital, whether through
increasing their assets or decreasing their liabilities. In recessions, however, banks
may have difficulty raising the necessary capital (Palley, 2000). This difficulty
stems from the higher risk of assets during a recession, whether that risk is real or
perceived (Segoviano & Lowe, 2002). The capital requirements may even worsen
the recession by tying up capital for non-performing assets (Palley, 2000).
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Carpenter, et al, did not find that the new accord is any more pro-cyclical than the
1988 version (2001).
The pro-cyclical issues of capital requirements are present during
expansions as well, but are seen as far less serious. As the riskiness of assets is
measured lower during expansions, the capital requirements are lowered even
though the actual level of capital increases as more and more assets, deemed less
risky than they may actually be, are created (Segoviano & Lowe, 2002). Capital
requirements, no matter how complex the risk calculations become, will most
likely always have pro-cyclical tendencies due to the pro-cyclical nature of capital
itself(Borio, Furfine & Lowe, 2001).
Other problems with capital requirements are subtler. For instance, while
problems have been evident in the first Basel Accord, it has been over 10 years
and a new accord is forthcoming. While integrating regulatory structures across
national boundaries may have several benefits, it cannot be in the best interest of
the domestic economy or the central monetary authority to adopt a scheme that
cannot be, or will not be, amended as necessary to meet the needs of the nation.
Additionally, and not least, capital requirements are placed on banks, not all
financial institutions (Palley, 2000). As it stands, capital requirements may be the
best way so far used to make banks account for the risks they take.
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Does a regulatory framework exist that could combine the benefits of
capital requirements for risk and reserve requirements as a potentially powerful
policy tool, even in light of financial innovation and deregulation?
Proposal: Asset-Based Reserve Requirements
Deregulation has led to fragility in the financial market, and asset based
bank supervision would hold banks accountable for the risks they take (Minsky &
Whalen, 1996). The concept of asset-based reserve requirements is one that may
become increasingly popular. The idea in theory is quite simple. Financial
institutions should hold required reserves that are a function of the type of assets
they hold, rather than the type of institution it is. The idea has been around for

"'""
several years. Goldenweiser ( 1951) mentions the idea as having been proposed
from ''time to time." He points out that it is unfamiliar and will receive much
opposition, but should· be "carefully studied" (Goldenweiser, 1951 ). Rousseas
( 1986) called the asset reserve proposal ''the most important" and "least
considered" of proposed changes in the regulatory structure.
The lack of information regarding asset-based reserve requirements
(ABRR) may be seen as an indication that there is some fundamental flaw in its
logic. However, it seems that the three main groups that would research the
subject are either not interested or have focused their support on other programs.
The three groups are bankers, persons with a stake in other financial institutions,
and regulators (the Fed). Bankers, while they might be interested in leveling the
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playing field with other financial institutions, may not want the additional reserves
likely to be required by ABRR. Also, now that banks can enter into the same asset
markets as other financial institutions, they would not want to hold reserves on
their new activities. For very similar reasons, other financial institutions, never
before subject to reserve requirements would not likely support an idea that would
impose requirements on them. Finally, the Fed has taken steps to force banks and
other financial institutions to account for risk through capital requirements and
Gramm-Leach Bliley (Furlong, 2000). Since they have invested the time and
expense in these endeavors, ABRR would be an added expense for the Fed to
research and implement, which may be why it is not devoting attention to the idea.
I should point out that reserves based on assets, like most other regulatory
schemes, is written about relating to banks in Goldenweiser, Rousseas, and Wray.
Palley, however, believes that the fairest and most effective way to implement
ABRR is to make it apply to all financial institutions.
Banks are currently required to hold reserves against their deposit liability
(Palley, 2000). The pace of financial innovation has led many people to hold much
less of their wealth as traditional deposits. Palley points out that in 1979, deposits
accounted for a full quarter ofhousehold financial assets, compared to only 10%
in 1999, shown in Table A3 (Palley, 2000).

P~2ple

are shifting where they hold

their money, and due to financial innovation and deregulation, they may not have
to take their money from the initial depository institution. The result of the shift
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away from traditional deposits is an exponentially widening gap between reserve
balances and financial sector assets, which is shown in Graph A6 (Palley, 2000).
Converting to a system of asset-based reserve requirements for all financial
institutions would reduce this growing gap, and hold institutions accountable for
the risks they take. For example, suppose a commercial bank that takes deposits
and makes loans begins to use deposits for more than just loans, and begins to
enter other markets, once reserved only for investment banks. The bank holds
reserves based on the level of deposits. Meanwhile, the security of those deposits
is undermined by the higher risks involved in the investment bank assets. Asset
based reserve requirements would correct that oversight by requiring banks to hold
reserves based on the riskiness of the assets they hold.
In the same example under the current system, the investment bank would

be at an inherent advantage relative to the commercial bank. The investment bank
would not be holding reserves based on its liabilities, since investment banks do
not hold deposits, but instead raise funds (liabilities) through selling commercial
paper and issuing stocks and bonds (Mishkin, 1998). The result is that the
investment bank would be holding the same assets as the commercial bank, but
with no reserves. The investment bank, in theory, could hold more assets of the
same type than the commercial bank. If the goal of deregulation like GrammLeach-Bliley and reducing reserve requirements was to enhance and encourage
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competition, then from this simple example, it is inadequate in achieving that
objective.
Before deregulation, when institutions held only certain assets and certain
liabilities, a liability based reserve system worked well. In effect, the liability
reserves were also asset reserves, since the two were linked. Now that deregulation
has homogenized the financial industry, asset based reserve requirements would
ensure that all financial institutions are taking adequate measure of the risks they
take (which capital requirements do), and to prevent some fmancial institutions
from having advantages over others in the same market (which capital
requirements do not do). The financial industry has seen a significant shift in
assets over the last 20 years. For example, banks and thrifts held 52% of financial
sector assets in 1979, compared to only 22% in 1999 (Palley, 2000). More detail is
presented in Table A4·of Appendix A.
Adoption of a system of asset-based reserve requirements could lead to
several advantages. The most obvious of these advantages is the increased
monetary control. With various assets being separated into categories based on
risk, the several different reserve requirements could help the Fed's ability to
control short-term interest rates

(Palley~

2001 ). Another aspect of the increased

monetary control is the Fed's ability to channel money into depressed sectors of
the economy, or divert money away from over-heating sectors by adjusting reserve
requirements (Rousseas, 1986).
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The Fed also could have the power to more accurately control the growth of
the economy. As it is now, the Fed can change the market interest rate (see the
Mathematical Appendix). This change in the market rate spills over to every other
interest rate in the domestic economy. The result is that investment spending and
consumer spending are both affected at the same time, in the same way (Palley,
2001 ). With ABRR, the Fed can alter the reserve requirements for commercial
loans without directly affecting consumer spending, or vice versa.
There are even macroeconomic benefits of asset-based reserve
requirements. Giving the Fed several policy instruments in the form of asset
reserve requirements will allow them to have more specific targets for the
economy (Palley, 2001). For example, if consumption is growing too rapidly, the
Fed could raise the reserve requirement on household loans, causing interest rates
to rise for consumers. Investment spending would remain largely unaltered,
because the investment interest rate would not be affected directly by Fed action.
The Fed may have to alter the investment reserve requirement to stop banks from
channeling the money for consumer loans into investment loans. The second
example in the Mathematical Appendix demonstrates just a couple of the many
possible variations that could be opened up for the Fed.
Under the current system of regulation, the Fed's primary target is the
money market interest rate, or more specifically, the federal funds rate. Using
interest rates to control asset prices can have unwanted spillover effects into other
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areas of the economy by affecting investment, consumption, the exchange rate,
and net exports. Asset-based reserve requirements would allow the Fed to directly
target specific types of assets, like shares of stock with inflated prices, by raising
the reserve requirement for equity (Palley, 2001). Raising the cost of holding
equity would drive the price of equities down as shown in example 3 in the
Mathematical Appendix.
Another benefit of asset-based reserve requirements is more implicit. All
interest rates, whether the rate charged on loans, or the rate paid on deposits, is
based on the money market rate (Palley, 2001). With the current reserve
requirement structure, it is the depositors who face lower rates of return due to
reserve requirements (Palley, 2001 ). Depositors do not create risk for the bank;
they are simply lending their money to the bank. In a system of ABRR, the
financial institution will pass some of the burden of reserve requirements onto the
borrower in the form of higher loan rates (Palley, 2001). The system makes not
only banks compensate for the risks they take, but also charges a premium on
'

those entering into potentially risky ventures.
Following from the lower rates to depositors comes the reduction of the
moral hazard problem created by deposit insurance. If banks and borrowers are
forced to take precaution in the form of ABRR for increasingly risky loans, the
incentive to engage in risky behavior because of deposit insurance is counteracted
by the higher cost of risky loans.
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Deregulation would not be an issue for financial fragility under a scheme of
ABRR. Since this proposal calls for the reserve requirements to be applicable to
the entire financial sector, mergers, acquisitions, or deregulation of industry
barriers would not lessen the power of the requirements (Palley, 2000). Financial
innovation could still be an obstacle to regulation, but it always has been and will

be. If a new asset type is developed, the Fed will determine its level of risk, and
assign an appropriate reserve requirement against it. The lag should not be
incredibly long, depending on the Fed's knowledge of what is going on in the
private sector.
It was noted earlier that capital requirements might possess some pro-

cyclical characteristics that might exacerbate an economic downturn or overinflate an expansion due to risk being overestimated or underestimated,
respectfully (Borio et al, 2001). Asset-based reserve requirements do not have the
inherent pro-cyclical qualities of capital requirements. If, in the course of a
recession, a loan ceases to perform, that is, the person or corporation with the loan
'

defaults, the asset is removed from the balance sheet, freeing up the required
reserves held against it (Palley, 2000). The financial institution has money
available to it when it needs money to extend credit the most (Palley, 2000).
Some drawbacks of asset-based reserve requirements include the problem
of converting to an entirely new system. The Federal Reserve would have more
power to control the economy, which some may see as inhibiting free markets.
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Some may believe reserve requirements may be too blunt of a policy tool. Also,
with that power to control the economy comes greater danger that the Federal
Reserve will use their authority incorrectly. Finally, if asset-based reserve
requirements are implemented only in one country, it becomes conceivable that
financial firms would flee the country to escape the new reserves (Palley, 2001).
Some solutions to this final problem include the adoption of asset-based
reserve requirements by major economic countries, as was done with the Basel
Accord (Palley, 2001). Palley goes on to point out that for businesses to shift
creates high cost, which might prohibit firms from moving, and that the U.S. has
characteristics important for businesses: a support services network, large numbers
of qualified personnel, and the stability of the government and regulation (2001).
Some discussion of the implementation of a system of asset-based reserve
requirements is necessary. First it should be pointed out that ABRR changes the
central bank's focus ''from money to the structure of assets" (Wray, 1990). For
asset-based reserve requirements to be successful, they must be imposed on all
'

financial institutions-that point bears repeating.
Currently, liability reserves can be held either as vault cash or as balances
with the Federal Reserve (Board of Governors, 1994). Those options should be
preserved. It might be beneficial to allow some portion of reserves to be held as
government bonds (Palley, 2001). A possible problem with allowing government
bond holdings to meet reserve requirements would be that if required reserves
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were lowered, the bonds being sold by financial institutions might create
depressed bond prices, or artificially high bond prices if reserve requirements were
raised, as financial institutions sought to buy bonds. Another option might be to
allow some portion of required reserves to be held in a special type of savings
account with a market-determined interest rate. Either bond holdings or a savings
account would help to lower the ''reserve tax" mentioned earlier.
The reserve requirements could be structured in several ways. Two specific
ones stand out as the most practical and understandable. First, adopt a system
similar to the old reserve requirement structure. Each asset type would have a
specific reserve ratio, and that amount would have to be held as vault cash or
Federal Reserve balances, or as government bonds or special savings. The second
scheme would be similar to the capital requirement structure developed by the
Basel Accord. Different asset types would be assigned a risk weight. The weighted
sum of the assets would yield a risk-adjusted total asset quantity, and reserves
would be based on that. In either case, some reserves with no risk would carry a
zero reserve requirement ratio (Palley, 2001). If the Fed believed an asset type to
be too risky, that asset type could be assigned a I 00% reserve requirement.
A possible potential benefit of allowing asset reserves to be held in two
forms is the added policy tool. The Fed could impose a maximum interest bearing
allowance (MIBA) on reserves. The MIBA would serve as the maximum
percentage of total required reserves that could be held in the form of government

Asset Base 44

bonds or in a special reserve savings account (if feasible). The MIBA could be
different for different asset types. The rest of the reserves would be held as
balances with the Federal Reserve. An analogy of this policy tool is a microscope.
On a microscope, a scientist first chooses a magnification setting to
determine how many times the object is to be magnified. This initial step is like
the reserve requirement itself for a particular asset. The magnification is related to
the relative riskiness of the asset. Once the appropriate level of magnification has
been selected, the scientist focuses the object in his sight. The focusing is similar
to adjusting the MIBA. The idea of the MIBA is to give the Fed a tool to fine-tune
the economy. For example, if the Fed determined that holding required reserves
that earned no interest would very negatively impact some asset types like mutual
funds, the Board of Governors could conceivably allow 100% of the required
reserves on that asset type to be held in the interest-bearing form. While the
owners of mutual fund shares might see lower rates of return in expansionary
times since reserve requirements would be held in assets earning lower interest
(government bonds or in a special savings account), they should also expect
smaller losses during recessions since the funds held as reserves would be earning
a steady interest payment. Similarly, this fine-tuning characteristic might lessen
the broad nature that changing reserve requirements could have on the economy.
The idea of MIBA may not be feasible. The Fed may not wish to have such
fine-tuning powers. The public may not want the Fed to have such fine-tuning
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powers in the economy. Even if a concept like MIBA is not practical, asset-based
reserve requirements might be able to provide a more uniform, more fair
regulatory structure for all firms in the financial sector of the United States
economy.
Asset-based reserve requirements could be costly to introduce and
implement. Banks and other financial institutions may have difficulty raising
funds to meet reserve requirements initially.. It is conceivable that credit markets
might be very tight at first as the financial sector begins to accumulate money for
new reserve requirements. For that reason, implementing ABRR at a time of
recession could have substantial negative repercussions on our economy. Even if
implemented during an expansion, ABRR would reduce the amount of available
funds for credit in the economy.
These problems of lessening credit may be sunnountable by a very slow
implementation of the regulatory structure. If financial companies had advanced
warning of what the requirements would be in 5 to 10 years, for example, they
would have more time to begin to accumulate the necessary requirements without
creating an immediate drain on credit in the economy. The Federal Reserve could
then require certain thresholds of required reserves be met each year until the
ABRR structure was to be fully in place.
One of the most notable aspects of ABRR is its versatility. Reserve
requirements on assets act as a measure of risk, like capital requirements. The
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reserves market and open market operations are still under the Fed's control. Also,
in theory, ABRR can be tailored to almost any desired level of central bank
intervention in the economy.
For example, if the Fed decided to implement ABRR, but set non-zero
requirements only on mortgages, consumer loans, and commercial loans, the
financial system would actually be changed very little from the current one.
Further, all assets could be held at zero reserve requirements, creating a basically
unregulated system. These two ideas would make implementing ABRR a moot
point since required reserves would be practically useless. They are provided
simply as examples of the broad range of possibilities available if ABRR were
implemented.
Asset-based reserve requirements as a plan does not require the Fed to
frequently change the reserve ratios, but they will have the option. Interest rate
targeting is still possible through open market operations. Specific interest rates
can be targeted using either the reserve requirements, or the MIB~ if it is used.
When determining the appropriateness and cost of a new plan, the future
must be considered. In spite of the short-term drawbacks of ABRR at the time of
implementation, the long-term stability, adaptability, and versatility make assetbased reserve requirements a viable option for the American financial sector.
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Conclusion

Since their creation in 1863, reserve requirements have been an important
aspect of banking regulation. As our nation's financial system has grown and
evolved, the role of reserve requirements, including their use, justification, and
implementation has grown and evolved as well. All regulatory schemes must be
updated from time to time to accommodate the changing nature of our economy.
Reserve requirements have changed because of changes such as
deregulation, financial innovation, and mergers. Evidence of this change can be
found in legislation like Gramm-Leach Bliley, Riegle-Neal, and the lowering of
reserve requirements in 1990 and 1992. Financial innovations like derivatives and
sweep accounts have allowed depository institutions to circumvent regulation.
Mergers between commercial banks and investment banks have blurred the lines
of separation in the once segregated industry. These changes have led to the near
obsolescence of reserve requirements in their present form. Required reserves can
still play an important policy role in the financial sector of our economy, if
'

appropriate changes are made to the current system. One such change may be the
adoption of a system of asset-based reserve requirements.
No regulatory scheme is perfect, including asset-based reserve
requirements. Despite the lack of attention to this policy, it has been demonstrated
that asset-based reserves are a superior alternative. A system of asset-based
reserve requirements that applied to all financial firms and covered all on- and off-
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balance sheet activities would give the Federal Reserve much greater scope to
conduct and implement monetary policy. Additionally, ABRR address the
concerns of structural financial fragility as developed by Dymski, Minsky, and
Wray. For those concerned with the implications of policy on firm behavior,
ABRR would provide a more level playing field for all financial institutions,
unlike the current system where one type, namely banks, are subject to greater
restriction and regulation. In addition, any financial institution could enter any
financial market under a system of ABRR, so long as adequate compensation for
risk is taken.
In comparison to other policy regimes, asset-based reserve requirements

combine the policy power of reserve requirements with the risk measurement and
accountability of capital requirements. Further, it combines them without the procyclical characteristics of capital requirements and without the burden on
depositors of the current liability-based reserve structure. There are many possible
forms the ABRR could take, and the optimal one must be determined before such
a structure is implemented. For the health of the entire economy, it makes sense to
apply asset-based reserve requirements to all firms conducting basically the same
function as banks, i.e., the whole financial sector.
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Appendix A:
Tables, Charts & Graphs

.

Table Al Money A,22re2ates
Ml =
Currency
+Traveler's Checks
+ Demand Deposits
+ Other Checkable Deposits
M2=

Ml
+ Small-denomination Time Deposits
+ Savings deposits and Money Market Deposit Accounts
+ Money Market Mutual Fund Shares (noninstitutional)

M3=
+
+
+
+
L=

M2
Large denomination Time Deposits
Money Market Mutual Fund Shares (institutional)
Term Repurchase AID"eements
Term Eurodollars

M3
+ Short-term Treasury Securities
+ Commercial Paper
+ Savings Bonds
+ Banker's Acceptances
Source: Mishkin, 1998, p. 59
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.

dian.es
. I I nerme
t
Ta ble A2 P.
nmary Assets and L.1abTti
11 esofF.10anc1a
Type ofIntermediary

Primary Liabilities

Primary Assets

Depository Institutions
Commercial Banks

Deposits

Savings and Loans
Mutual Savings Banks
Credit Unions

Deposits
Deposits
Deposits

Consumer and business
loans, mortgages,
government securities,
municipal bonds
Mortgages
Mortgages
Consumer loans

Contractual Savings
Institutions
Life Insurance Cos.

Premiums

Fire & Casualty
Insurance Cos.

Premiums

Pension funds

Employer and employee
contributions

Corporate bonds and
mortgages
Municipal bonds,
corporate bonds and
stocks, government
securities
Corporate bonds and
stocks

Investment
Intermediaries
Finance Cos.

.

Commercial paper,
stocks, bonds
Shares
Shares

Mutual Funds
Money market mutual
funds
Source: Mishkin, 1998, p. 38.

Consumer and business
loans
Stocks, bonds
Money market
instruments
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.

. IAsset s
T a ble A3 C ompos1"tiODOf HousehoId F"manc1a
Tvne of Holdinfl
1979 1999
10%
25%
Denosits
2%
4%
Life Insurance Reserves
14%
30%
Pension Fund Reserves
11%
1%
Mutual Fund Shares
13% 23%
Coroorate Equities
Equity in Non-corporate Business
30%
13%
Bonds & Notes
8%
6%
5%
5%
Other*
*Includes security credit, bank personal trusts, and miscellaneous
Source: Palley, 2000, p. 4.
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Table A4: Shares of Financial Sector Assets
Industrv See:ment
1979 1999
Banks & Thrifts
52% 22%
Insurance Companies
11%
8%
Pension Funds
17% 26%
Mutual Funds
3%
18%
Nonbank Lenders
5%
3%
GSEs & Federally Regulated Mortgage Pools
6%
12%
Other*
11%
6%
*Includes bank personal trusts, security brokers & dealers, ABS issues, REITs
and funding corporations
Source: Palley, 2000, p. 5.
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Chart Al: Reserve Requirements based on geographic distinctions among
member banks, 1913-66

Ed
n o f year reserve requrrement , as a percent age o f depos1 s
Year
1913
1917
1936
1937
1938
1941
1942
1948
1949
1951
1953
1954
1958
1960
1962

Net Demand Deposits
Central reserve
reserve city
country banks
city banks
banks
18
15
12
13
10
7
19.5
15
10.5
26
14
20
22.75
17.5
12
14
26
20
20
14
20
26
22
16
22
18
12
14
24
20
22
13
19
20
18
12
18
16.5
11
16.5
12
16.54
12
16.5
16.5

Time Deposits
(all classes of
banks)
5
3
4.5
6
5
6
6
7.5
5
6
6
5
5
5
4

Source: Feinman, 199?,p.587

This chart displays different reserve requirement ratios from 1913 to 1962.
The years are significant in that in 1913, the Federal Reserve System was
established, and in 1962, the Fed lost the authority to classify banks by their
proximity to reserve cities (Feinman, 1993).
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Chart A2: Reserve Requirements based on geographic distinctions among
member banks and on the level of deposits, 1966-72

End of year reserve requirements, as a percentage of deposits
Time De osits
Net Demand De osits
Year
Other time de osits
Reserve·ci banks
banks
Savings
Over 5*
0-5*
Over 5*
0-5*
12
4
4
6
1966
16.5
12
3
3
6
1967
12
16.5
12.5
3
6
17
3
1968
16.5
12
3
3
6
1969
17
17.5
12.5
13
1970
17
17.5
12.5
3
5
3
13
* Deposit intervals in millions of dollars
Source: Feinman, 1993,p.588

In 1966, the Federal Reserve began to implement a graduated reserve

system, based on where the banks were located (Feinman, 1993 ). This system was
adapted through 1972, when a new system of graduated reserves was
implemented, without regard to reserve city or country designations (Feinman,
1993).
Chart 3 on the following page shows the reserve requirement ratios for the
years of the graduated reserve system until the passage of the Monetary Control
Act of 1980.

17.5
18
17.5
16.5
16.25

10-100*

1972
10
8
12
13
1973
8
10
12.5
13.5
1974
10.5
12.5
13.5
8
10
1975
7.5
12
13
1976
11.75
7
9.5
12.75
* Deposit intervals in millions of dollars
Source: Feinman, 1993, p. 588

2-10*

Over
400*

0-2*

100400*

Year

3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
2.5

3
3
3
1
1

180 days
Over4
to 4
years
months

5
5
6
6
6

30-179
days

5
5
3
3
2.5

5
5
3
1
1

180 days
Over4
to 4
years
years

Time and Savings Deposits
0-5*, by maturity
Over 5*, by maturity

Savings 30-179
days

End of vear reserve reauirements.
, as a .oercenta2e
.
...... of deoosits
"
Net Demand Deposits

Chart A3: Graduated reserve schedule for member banks, 1972-80
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Chart A4: Reserve Requirements since passage of Monetary Control Act of

1980
End ofyear reserve requirements, as a percentage of deposits
Net transactions Nontransactions
Year
accounts
accounts
1980
12
3
1990
12
0
1992
10
0
Source: Feinman, 1993,p.589
The above chart shows reserve requirements from the passage of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 through the present. The most recent time
requirements were changed was 1992 (Feinman, 1993).

Source: Federal Reserve
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Graph A5: Sweeps of Retail Transaction Deposits into Savings Deposits
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AppendixB
Mathematical Appendix
The following mathematical examples were adapted from Palley, 2001.
They are meant to provide a more concrete example of how asset-based reserve
requirements (ABRR) differs from the current system of liability-based reserve
requirements (LBRR).
The models provided are meant to apply to a "generic financial firm"
(Palley, 2001 ). They could apply to either a traditional bank, or other financial
institutions (Palley, 2001 ). Constant marginal costs are assumed in all models,
implying that the size of the individual firm is indeterminate (Palley, 2001). For
the ABRR scenarios presented, it is assumed that the regulatory framework applies
to all financial institutions in the economy (Palley, 2001 ).
Example Bl: Interest Rate Determination

The following calculations will demonstrate how interest for different asset
and liability types are determined in both a system of LBRR and a system of
'

ABRR. Regardless of regulatory regime, profit is calculated by subtracting the
liabilities of the bank (deposits), any money market borrowing, and the costs
associated with bank assets (loans) from the income flow of the loans. This is
maximized subject to a balance sheet constraint regarding how much may be
loaned from the deposits and money market balances.
L = investment loans
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=consumer loans
D =short-term deposits

H

T = long-term deposits
F = money market borrowings (F > 0) or lending (F < 0)
~

= interest rate (j = L, H, D, T, F)

Rj

=constant marginal cost per dollar of administering loans and liabilities

(j = L, H, D, T, F)

=probability per dollar of default on loans (j = L, H)
kj =reserve requirement ratio (j = D, T in LBRR, j = L, H in ABRR)
rr =total profit of the financial institution
pj

lnLBRR,
(1)

Max II= kL + iHH-(ar, + pL)L-(aH + PH)H-(io + ao)D-(iT + aT)T
-(iF + SF)F

Subject to,
(1.1) L+H=(l-ko)D+(l-kT)T+F
Rearranging ( 1.1) by solving for F yields:
(1.12) F = L + H-(1 -ko)D-(1-kT)T
Substituting (1.12) into (1), results in:

(2)

Max ll = kL + iHH - (aL + PL)L - (8tt + PH)H - (io +ao)D - (ir + aT)T
-

(iF + aF)[L + H-(1-ko)D-(l -kT)T]
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Taking the first-order partial derivative with respect to L, H, T, and D, the interest
rates on investment and consumer loans, and short- and long-tenn deposits are
calculated.
(2.1) 8I1/8L = k- aL -PL - ip - ap
(2.2) 8I1/8H = itt -

~-

PH - iF - ap

(2.3) 8I1/8T = - h- ar + (iF + ap)(l -kr)
(2.4) 8I1/8D = - io- an+ (iF + ap)(l -

ko)

Solving for the specific interest rates yields:

(2.11) k = iF + ap + aL +PL
(2.12) itt = itt +
(2.13)

3.p

+ ~ +PH

h = (1- kr)(iF + ap) - ar

(2.14) in= (1-ko)(iF + ap) - an
The monetary authority determines ip. Banks seek to establish an efficient
portfolio of liabilities, where the marginal cost (MC) of each liability is equal, i.e.,
MCp = MCn = MC1 . Looking at (2.11) through (2.14), it can be seen that reserve
requirements on liabilities,

ko and kr, lowers i0 and h respectively, and therefore,

raise MCn and MCr. Under this system, banks clearly have an incentive to seek
funds in the fonn of liabilities that would not have reserve requirements.
Incidentally, the reserve requirements may be seen as a burden on the depositors.
In ABRR, the profit function is the same:
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(3)

Max II = ir,L + iHH - (BL+ PL)L - (aH + PH)H - (in+ ao)D - (h + aT)T

The balance sheet constraint under ABRR is different since the reserve
requirements are associated with the bank's assets.
(3.1) (1 + ki,)L + (1 + ki:i)H = D + T + F

Rearranging by solving for F yields:
(3.12) F = (1 + ki,)L + (1 + ki:i)H-D-T

This form of the equation is substituted into (3):
(4)

Max Il = ir,L + iHH-(aL + PL)L-(aH + PH)H-(io + ao)D-(h + aT)T

Once again, the first-order partial derivatives are taken to show the interest rates.
(4.1) oII/OL = k-BL-PL-(iF + ap)(l +lei.)
(4.2) oil/OH = iH -

aii- PH -

(iF + ap)(1 + ki:i)

(4.3) oil/OT = - h - aT + ip + ap
(4.4) oIIIOD = - io- an+ iF + ap
'

Solving for the specific interest rates results in:
(4.11)

ii= (iF + ap)(l +lei.)+ BL+ PL

(4.12) iH = (iF + ap)(l + ki:i) + 3H +PH
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Under ABRR, interest rates are still determined in relation to the money
market rate. Reserve requirements raise the costs associated with holding loans.
Also, having reserve requirements related to assets clearly gives the central
monetary authority the ability to control which types of :financial institution assets
by changing the respective reserve requirements.

Example Bl: Macroeconomic Policies
In this macroeconomic example using the ISLM model, all quantities are
assumed to be real. Previous variable definitions still apply. In these scenarios, Y,
NX, and e are endogenous variables. The policy variables are G, t, ip, kD, and kT.
Monetary policy is all that will be used to demonstrate the effect of the two
reserve requirement schemes.

Y= output
C = consumption

I = investment

G = government spending
NX = net exports
t =taxes

e

=exchange rate

iF*

=foreign money market rate

(5)

y

= C(iH, iD, h, (1-t)Y) + I(iL) + G + NX

(6)

NX =NX(e,Y)
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(7)

e = e(iF/ip)

In LBRR, substituting the interest rate equations (2.11)-(2.14) into (5)
yields:
(5.1) Y = C(iF + aF + aH +pH, (1 -kn(iF + aF)- aT, (1-t)Y)
+ l(iF + aF +aL+pL)+G+ NX
Suppose consumption has been growing. The Federal Reserve wants to slow
consumption and slow output in the process. Under the current system, the Fed
will most likely accomplish this end by raising the money market interest rate.
iFt

=>int and ht:::::) saving t => ci:::::) Yi
=>k t::::>Ii=>vi
=>et=>NXi=>vi

Clearly, output has fallen, as has consumption, but as a result, so have investment
spending and net exports.

In a system using ABRR, the same goals can be achieved with very
different side effects. Substituting (4.11)-(4.14) into equation (5) will give the
following output function:
(5.2) Y = C([iF + aF)[l +kill+ 8JI + J>H, iF + aF -

ao, iF + aF - aT, (1-t)Y)

+ l((iF + ap][l + kL] + aL +PL)+ G + NX
Once again, the Fed wants to slow consumption and output. Under ABRR, the Fed
can accomplish this by raising the reserve requirement on household loans.
ki!t=>ci=>vi
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Since iF was not changed, investment spending remains constant, the exchange
rate does not fall. Net exports may fall to some degree due to the new, lower level
of output, but not as far as it fell when both the exchange rate and output fell in the
LBRR scenario.
Asset-based reserve requirements give the Federal Reserve much more
room to maneuver the economy by using multiple policy tools at once. For
example, suppose the Fed would like to improve the U.S. current account by
increasing exports and investment, while keeping consumer consumption
relatively constant.
iF-1..

=>e-1..=>NXt
=>it-1..=>It
=> iH -1.. => C t (under LBRR)

Under ABRR kii can tie raised to discourage consumer loans, which should help
keep consumption relatively constant. This example shows how the Fed can use
multiple policy tools to achieve very specific monetary policy goals.

Example B3: Asset Price Inftation
This example deals with the problem of asset price inflation, particularly
equity. Inflated asset prices often produce a large wealth effect on consumption
(cited in Palley, 2001 ).
q

=equity prices

IIq = profits from equities
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iq = rate of return on equities
z = equity premium

kq

=reserve requirement on equity

(5.3) Y = C([iF + ap](l + ktt] + aH +PH, iF + ap - ao, ip + ap - ar, (1-t)Y, q)
+ l([iF + ap][ 1 + kL] + aL + PL) + G + NX
(8)

q = llqliq

Equation (8) shows that the price of a share of equity should be the profits
expected to be earned discounted by the rate of return. Further, a rational
consumer would not purchase equities beyond the point where the risk-adjusted
rate of return on equity equaled the safe return on deposits.
(9)

iql(l + kq) = io + z

If equity prices inflate dramatically, the Fed could raise the reserve requirement on

.

equity, lowering the rate of return on equity, which should then bring equity prices
back down to acceptable levels.

